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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
bestowed upon the Securities and Exchange Commission the right to
pursue an enforcement action against any person either in federal court or
through an administrative proceeding. Since 2012, the SEC has chosen to
pursue an unprecedented percentage of its enforcement actions
administratively, and it has prevailed in those administrative proceedings at
a much higher rate than in federal court. Since mid-2015, administrative
respondents have begun turning to the federal courts for relief, alleging that
administrative law judges, the SEC employees who preside over
administrative proceedings, are appointed in violation of Article II’s
Appointments Clause and therefore have no lawful authority to hear cases.
The challengers found early success in a number of district courts,
both in establishing subject matter jurisdiction and in securing preliminary
injunctions on the merits. Between August 2015 and December 2016,
however, the momentum quickly shifted in favor of the SEC. Five federal
appellate courts—the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit
Courts of Appeals—have all found that the federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to hear challenges addressing an ALJ’s constitutional
authority to preside over an enforcement action until the respondent has
exhausted all administrative remedies provided by the relevant statute. In
other words, the appellate courts have held that an administrative
respondent may not collaterally attack the constitutionality of an
administrative proceeding in federal court before the administrative
proceeding is complete—rather, the administrative respondent must wait
* J.D., 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank the
Honorable Cheryl Ann Krause of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
and Mary Mulligan of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP for their invaluable
guidance in shaping the topic and execution of this Article.
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for an adverse ALJ decision, appeal that decision directly to the full
Commission, and only then, once the administrative proceeding has
concluded, may the respondent seek judicial review through a proper
federal court of appeals.
While the jurisdictional question is now all but settled, the merits
question is very much alive. In August 2016, the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the first federal appellate court to rule on a
fully ripe Appointments Clause challenge, held that SEC ALJs are mere
employees of the SEC, not “inferior officers” within the meaning of Article
II, and thus do not trigger Article II’s protections. The D.C. Circuit’s
decision represented a significant victory for the SEC. In December 2016,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit came to
the opposite conclusion, holding that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally
appointed inferior officers and creating a significant circuit split worthy of
Supreme Court review. While the judicial landscape continues to rapidly
evolve, administrative respondents seeking to challenge ALJs’
constitutional authority to hear cases should be emboldened by the Tenth
Circuit’s decision. Challengers should continue to assert that the SEC’s
ALJ appointment scheme violates the Constitution, although they should
now wait until the administrative proceeding is complete and should bring
the subsequent judicial challenge in the federal court of appeals in the
circuit in which they reside, rather than in the D.C. Circuit. This Article
encourages courts hearing such challenges to follow the Tenth Circuit, not
the D.C. Circuit, and to hold that the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme
violates the protections provided by the Appointments Clause of Article II
of the United States Constitution.
In addition to the Appointments Clause challenges, the SEC has faced
a deluge of criticism from judges, academics, and practitioners over its
administrative system as a whole, which many feel gives the Commission
an unfair advantage when it decides to pursue an enforcement action
administratively. While the SEC has steadfastly refused to reappoint its
ALJs in accordance with the Appointments Clause, it has capitulated to the
growing criticism by adopting a number of amendments to the Rules of
Practice that govern its administrative proceedings and by promulgating
guidance regarding forum selection. This Article argues that these
concessions are a step in the right direction but that they do not go far
enough in leveling the playing field between the SEC and administrative
respondents. It also urges the SEC to undertake a number of concrete steps
to restore public trust and to protect the constitutional rights of individuals
and entities accused of wrongdoing.
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INTRODUCTION
With its passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress authorized the Securities and
Exchange Commission to seek civil penalties from any person accused of
violating the securities laws either in an administrative proceeding or in
federal district court.1 Prior to Dodd-Frank, if the SEC wanted to seek
monetary penalties from non-regulated entities or individuals, it had to
bring its case in federal court. Now, the SEC can bring such cases
administratively in its in-house courts in front of its in-house judges. The
newfound grant of power is significant, and the SEC has been taking full
advantage of it.
The Commission brought approximately eighty percent of its
enforcement actions as administrative proceedings, rather than in federal
district court, in the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015, which was
roughly the same percent that it brought in the prior fiscal year but twenty
percent more than its average between 2005 and 2013.2 The increased use
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-2 (2012).
2. Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2015, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 3 tbl. 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-marketdata/secstats2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKR5-8DU5] [hereinafter Select SEC and Market
Data 2015]; Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2014, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 3 tbl. 2 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-marketdata/secstats2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BP6-9LQE] [hereinafter Select SEC and Market
Data 2014]. See also Ryan Jones, Comment, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of
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of administrative proceedings should not be surprising, given that the SEC
won more than ninety percent of its contested administrative proceedings
from October 2010 through March 2015, while winning only sixty-nine
percent of the cases it brought in federal court over the same period.3
The Commission’s noteworthy administrative winning percentage
should not be surprising either, given the significant procedural advantages
that come with bringing cases administratively.
Administrative
proceedings operate on an expedited schedule, undermining respondents’
ability to prepare for hearings and defend themselves.4 Respondents in
administrative proceedings are entitled to far less discovery than what is
available in federal court, leaving respondents with little more than the
record that the Commission itself developed during its investigation.5
Administrative proceedings are tried without a jury to an ALJ appointed,
employed, and paid by the Commission,6 and appeals of adverse
administrative decisions must be brought to the same five-member
Commission that authorized the enforcement action in the first place.7
The Article proceeds in four parts.
First, it discusses SEC
administrative proceedings generally, describes how administrative
proceedings differ from cases brought in federal district court, and notes
the SEC’s recent trend in favor of bringing a larger percentage of its
enforcement actions administratively. Second, the Article presents a
number of criticisms and constitutional challenges levied at SEC
administrative proceedings, arguing specifically that federal courts should
rule that the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme is unconstitutional. Third, the
Article discusses and evaluates the Commission’s two main responses to
that criticism—adopting proposed amendments to its Rules of Practice and
promulgating guidance regarding forum selection. Finally, the Article
concludes by suggesting a number of concrete steps that the SEC should
take to ameliorate the constitutional violations and assuage concerns that
administrative proceedings offer the SEC an unfair “home field
advantage.”

the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 524 (2015)
(collecting SEC enforcement action data from 2005 to 2014).
3. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803
[https://perma.cc/AV2X-VCEQ] [hereinafter Eaglesham, SEC Wins].
4. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 201.230-234.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 201.410.
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SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission by statute
in 19348 and charged it with serving the public by “enforcing the federal
securities laws and regulating securities broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and national securities exchanges.”9 The Commission fulfills its
mission in a number of different ways, including through disciplinary
actions brought by its Enforcement Division.10
Historically, the Commission could bring enforcement actions
administratively only in limited circumstances, such as when the
Commission was targeting regulated entities or seeking only cease-anddesist orders or disgorgement.11 With its passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010, however, Congress authorized the Commission to seek a full range of
remedies, including civil monetary penalties, from any party accused of
wrongdoing, not simply from the industry insiders who it was previously
allowed to target administratively.12
In administrative proceedings, an ALJ appointed and employed by the
SEC presides over the matter and issues the initial decision.13 SEC ALJs
enjoy career appointments, their salaries are specified by statute, and they
are not subject to the probationary periods that apply to certain other
government employees.14 In administrative proceedings, ALJs serve as the
finder of fact and law and have powers and responsibilities nearly
equivalent to those of a federal judge presiding over a bench trial, including
administering oaths, issuing subpoenas, taking and ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, and generally overseeing proceedings.15 ALJs
ultimately decide whether the respondent violated the law,16 and their
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
9. DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS § 7:1 (2015).
10. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1978) (authorizing
administrative agencies, such as the SEC, to conduct adjudicative proceedings
administratively). See also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm [https://perma.cc/F8R45CLY] (last visited Aug. 22, 2016) (“The Commission’s enforcement staff conducts
investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and prosecutes the
Commission’s civil suits in the federal courts as well as its administrative proceedings.”).
11. See Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Prior to the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC was authorized to impose civil penalties in
Administrative Proceedings only against ‘regulated person[s]’ or companies.”).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2.
13. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. § 201.360.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 201.111.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360.
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decision is appealable to the full Commission.17 If the ALJ’s decision is
not appealed or the Commission declines to review it, the Commission
enters an order that the ALJ’s decision has become final and the action
“shall, for all purposes, . . . be deemed the action of the Commission.”18
A. Administrative and Federal District Court Proceedings
Differentiated
While the remedies available to the SEC administratively and in
federal district court are now comparable, administrative proceedings are
fundamentally different from traditional federal district court proceedings.
According to many, the differences redound almost entirely to the
Commission’s benefit and “stack the deck”19 in a way that amounts to a
“home court advantage”20 for the Commission.
First, administrative proceedings move at a much faster pace than
cases brought in federal district court. Until recently, the presiding ALJ
had only 300 days from the date of service of the Order Instituting
Proceedings (“OIP”), the Commission’s charging instrument, to render a
decision, and the hearing was required to be held within four months from
the date of service of the OIP.21 Within those four months, the respondent
needed to answer the OIP, review the Commission’s often-voluminous
investigative file, prepare for the hearing, and attend the hearing. In what
remained of the 300 days, the respondent had to review the transcript and
submit any post-hearing briefing. Under the Commission’s July 13, 2016
amendments to its Rules of Practice, respondents now have as many as ten
months to prepare, instead of four.22 While counsel for the respondent still
has a limited time to prepare, the Commission may take as long as it wants
to investigate a case before filing the OIP, subject only to the applicable
statute of limitations. Given that the Commission has a very significant
17. 17 C.F.R. § 201.411.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c).
19. SEC In-house Justice System Stacks the Deck, INVESTMENTNEWS (July 26, 2015,
12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150726/REG/307269998/sec-inhouse-justice-system-stacks-the-deck [https://perma.cc/3WNM-TKC2].
20. Joel M. Cohen, Mary Kay Dunning, & Darcy Harris, SEC Plans to Play InsiderTrading Cases on Home Court, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 16, 2014,
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202670286446/SEC-Plans-to-Play-InsiderTradingCases-on-Home-Court-?slreturn=20151022101115 [https://perma.cc/E24A-43GM].
21. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).
22. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Commission’s Rules of
Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), Final Rule 360,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGL4-KK8Z]; 17
C.F.R. § 201.360(a). For an extended discussion of the SEC’s amendments to its Rules of
Practice, see infra Part III.A.
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amount of time to gather and review documents and to conduct extensive
witness interviews before filing charges, some argue that the expedited
administrative schedule undermines respondents’ abilities to defend
themselves and calls into question the fairness of the entire administrative
scheme.23
Second, respondents in administrative proceedings are entitled to far
less discovery than is available in federal district court. While the
Commission is required to turn over much of its investigative file before
serving the OIP and the respondent can ask the ALJ to issue subpoenas to
third parties and to the Commission for documents and for testimony of
witnesses who are unlikely to be available at the hearing,24 until the recent
amendments, the Commission’s Rules of Practice contained no provisions
for typical depositions or interrogatories.25 This means that respondents
had to either call witnesses to the stand with no knowledge of what they
might say, if they were not interviewed by the SEC and therefore not
included in its investigative file, or for those that did testify before the
Commission, with no ability to develop impeachment or respondentfriendly material in advance. Under the amended Rules of Practice, each
side is permitted to take up to three depositions in a single-party
administrative proceeding, up to five depositions in a multi-party
administrative proceeding, and up to two additional depositions upon the
showing of a compelling need.26 The Commission’s Rules also permit the
introduction of hearsay and other evidence that would be inadmissible in
federal court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.27 These limited
discovery provisions leave respondents with little more than the record the
Commission itself developed during the course of its investigation.
Third, administrative proceedings are tried without a jury to an ALJ
appointed, employed, and paid by the Commission, creating a potential for
bias.28 Indeed, one former ALJ commented that she was criticized for
finding in favor of respondents too often and that ALJs were expected to
work under the assumption that “the burden was on the people who were
accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they did.”29
While the rationale of utilizing ALJs to hear complex securities cases
23. Jones, supra note 2, at 524.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 201.230-232.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 201.233-234.
26. Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), Final Rule
233; 17 C.F.R. § 201.233.
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (“The Commission or the hearing officer may receive
relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious.”).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. § 930.204.
29. Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
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requiring specialized expertise has intuitive appeal, complex securities
cases are not fundamentally different from general complex commercial
cases, which federal district court judges and juries hear regularly. Further,
the need for a specialized decision-maker diminished considerably when
the Commission expanded from bringing administrative proceedings only
against regulated entities to bringing administrative proceedings against
non-regulated entities.30
If a respondent is unsatisfied with an adverse ALJ determination, the
respondent must appeal to the full Commission in the first instance.31
While the Commission’s review is de novo based on the record in the case,
briefing, and argument,32 the Commission is the entity that authorized the
Enforcement Division to bring the action against the respondent in the first
place,33 meaning that the Commission “is akin to the prosecutor and then,
in an appeal, the judge in the same case.”34 If the Commission affirms the
ALJ’s decision, the respondent may then appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or to the federal court of
appeals in the circuit in which the respondent resides.35 At that point, the
court of appeals retains exclusive jurisdiction “to affirm or modify and
enforce or set aside the order in whole or in part.”36 However, by the time a
case reaches a federal court of appeals, the court of appeals’ role is quite
limited because Commission administrative decisions are entitled to
deference.37
30. Some commentators have pointed out that SEC ALJs are not even particularly
specialized in securities law. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94
TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1178 (2016) (chronicling the background of SEC ALJs, who often join
the SEC from other administrative agencies such as the Social Security Administration, and
concluding that “[a]s relative newcomers to securities work, these adjudicators did not come
with a depth of knowledge about the nature of securities litigation or administrative
proceedings at the SEC; nor would they have been known, and held in particular esteem, by
the securities bar upon appointment”).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 201.410.
32. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452.
33. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 2.5 (2015),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J23FD4LJ].
34. Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3 (quoting Bradley Bondi, a former counsel to
two former SEC commissioners).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(3).
37. See Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holding that “a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”). But see Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d
1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that a decision made by the full Commission was not
supported by substantial evidence). SEC ALJs’ formal rulings on otherwise undecided
issues of statutory interpretation of the securities laws made in the context of administrative
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B. Recent Trends in SEC Enforcement
While the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law in 2010, only recently
has the Commission been taking advantage of its benefits by bringing a
greater number of cases administratively. The Commission initiated only
462 administrative proceedings in fiscal year 2012, but it initiated 610 such
proceedings in fiscal year 2014 and 645 in fiscal year 2015.38 Conversely,
it initiated 272 civil actions in fiscal year 2012, but only 145 civil actions in
fiscal year 2014 and 162 in fiscal year 2015.39 The number of enforcement
actions brought administratively in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, as opposed
to in federal court, amounted to approximately eighty percent of the SEC’s
enforcement actions, while only sixty-three percent of its enforcement
actions were brought administratively in fiscal year 2012.40 Between 2005
and 2013, the SEC brought only fifty-nine percent of its enforcement
actions administratively on average, over twenty percent less than in fiscal
years 2014 and 2015.41 Indeed, one senior SEC official commented that it
is “fair to say” that the increased use of administrative proceedings is “the
new normal.”42
When the Commission does bring enforcement actions
administratively rather than in federal court, it wins at a noteworthy rate.
According to one study, the SEC won more than ninety percent of
contested administrated proceedings from October 2010 through March
2015, while winning only sixty-nine percent of its federal court cases over
the same period.43 In 2014, the Commission won all six administrative
hearings that came to verdict, but lost seven of the eighteen cases that it
adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference in the same manner as are rules enacted by
the Commission. See Steven Croley, THE SCOPE OF CHEVRON 2-3 (July 2001) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc
[https://perma.cc/C4X4-YRPM] (“The Supreme Court has made it clear that Chevron
deference is not to be confined to interpretations occasioned by agency rulemaking,
however, but extends to agency interpretations made in connection with a formal
adjudication, including enforcement actions.”).
38. Select SEC and Market Data 2015 3 tbl. 2; Select SEC and Market Data 2014 3 tbl.
2; Select SEC and Market Data: Fiscal 2012, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
3 tbl. 2 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMR8ASEV].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Jones, supra note 2, at 518.
42. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
21,
2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-itappoints-1413849590 [https://perma.cc/5RZQ-58DF] (quoting Kara Brockmeyer, chief of
the Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit).
43. Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
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litigated in federal court.44 Many expect that given its recent high-profile
losses in federal court45 and the Commission’s “near-perfect” record before
its ALJs, the Commission will continue to bring more cases
administratively.46 Indeed, the Commission appeared to be bracing for
such an increase when it hired two new ALJs in late 2014, bringing the
total number of SEC ALJs to five,47 and when it increased the Office of
Administrative Law Judges’ budget by forty-four percent for the 20142015 fiscal year.48 The disparity in success rates has led commentators to
observe that “ALJs’ close ties with the agency, combined with the
[administrative law court] outcome record, suggests that there may exist
some bias within the SEC’s [administrative law courts].”49
II.

CHALLENGES TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SCHEME

A. General Criticism
The Commission has come under heavy criticism for its “new normal”
of bringing administrative enforcement actions against non-regulated
entities. United States District Judge Jed S. Rakoff, for example, has
warned of the “dangers that seem . . . to lurk in the S.E.C.’s apparent new
policy of bringing a greater percentage of its significant enforcement
actions as administrative proceedings.”50 Since formal administrative
decisions made by ALJs are entitled to deference and most significant SEC
cases, especially those involving complicated or novel questions of law, are
brought under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities
44. Jones, supra note 2, at 519.
45. In two highly-publicized insider-trading cases, the SEC brought actions with novel
and difficult legal theories in federal court. Both were dismissed by the district court, but
the issues were ultimately resolved favorably to the SEC on appeal. When the SEC retried
the cases to juries on remand, the SEC lost both cases. See Jed. S. Rakoff, PLI Securities
Regulation Institute Keynote Address, Is the S.E.C. Becoming a Law Unto Itself?, Nov. 5,
2014, https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U8U8-LCE7] (citing SEC v. Obus and SEC v. Cuban).
46. See, e.g., David A. Wilson, Coming to an Administrative Law Judge Near You:
Insider-Trading Cases, 30 No. 12 WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIAB. 2
(2014).
47. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces New
Hires in the Office of Administrative Law Judges, Release No. 2014-129 (June 30, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542202073
[https://perma.cc/WC8E-KMXK].
48. Eaglesham, SEC Wins, supra note 3.
49. Tyler L. Spunaugle, Comment, The SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative
Proceedings: Increased Efficiency or Unconstitutional Expansion of Agency Power?, 34
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 413 (2015).
50. Rakoff, supra note 45, at 1.
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laws,51 Judge Rakoff expressed his concern that the increase in
administrative enforcement actions may effectively lead to the securities
laws being made “not by neutral federal courts, but by S.E.C.
administrative judges.”52 According to Judge Rakoff, a trend toward
preferring administrative proceedings to federal courts will “hinder[] the
balanced development of the securities laws” and will be “unlikely . . . to
lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial interpretations as would result
from having those cases brought in federal court.”53
Commentators have criticized the Commission on public policy
grounds as well. One commentator has theorized that a main reason the
SEC is bringing an increased number of cases administratively is to gain
increased bargaining power.54 Indeed, Andrew Ceresney, the Director of
the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has acknowledged that simply by
threatening to bring an enforcement action administratively rather than in
federal court, the Commission enjoys increased bargaining power in
settlement talks.55 Since the majority of cases settle before trial, increased
bargaining power in settlement negotiations provides the Commission with
a significant advantage. Commentators have also argued that the SEC
“places far too much significance on simply winning cases and collecting
monetary penalties . . . rather than deterring future illegal action and
protecting the public,” which may lead non-regulated entities to see
settlements as a “cost of doing business.”56
Congress has held hearings to examine the constitutionality of ALJ
appointments and related constitutional issues of due process, with the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets remarking on the “very
troubling pattern of the SEC’s attempting to stack the rules and process in a
way that the outcome of the case is, well, predetermined.”57
51. Judge Rakoff also pointed out that the development of the law under the “catch-all
provisions” of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act has “mostly been judge-made.” Id. at 8.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id. at 7, 11.
54. Spunaugle, supra note 49, at 411.
55. Brian Mahoney, SEC Could Bring More Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360,
(June 11, 2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/sec-could-bring-moreinsider-trading-cases-in-house [https://perma.cc/UQ3U-QLW5] (“I will tell you that there
have been a number of cases in recent months where we have threatened administrative
proceedings, it was something we told the other side we were going to do and they
settled.”).
56. Jones, supra note 2, at 532.
57. Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 114th Cong. 2-3 (2015)
(statement of Rep. Scott Garrett) (“While bringing more cases through the administrative
proceedings can lead to lower costs for the agency and increases in efficiency, it is

220

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19:1

Senior Commission officials have steadfastly defended the integrity of
the Commission’s increased used of administrative proceedings. SEC
Chair Mary Jo White has called the Commission’s use of administrative
proceedings “very fair.”58 Ceresney has stated that the Commission’s use
of administrative forums is “eminently proper, appropriate, and fair to
respondents.”59 Specifically, Ceresney noted that the Commission’s
relaxed evidentiary rules can even “benefit the respondents” because
“witnesses’ recollections are fresher” and the rules may give respondents
“more flexibility in offering evidence.”60 The Commission has also argued
that by relying on ALJs, it is taking advantage of subject matter experts to
fairly and efficiently resolve “complicated . . . securities and financial
law . . . cases that the district courts are often ill-prepared to handle,”
freeing up “overburdened district courts, potentially providing benefits for
the entire legal system.”61
B. Constitutional Challenges
The most significant criticisms facing the SEC come not from federal
judges in their personal capacities or legal commentators but from
respondents bringing constitutional challenges to the Commission’s right to
pursue enforcement actions outside of federal court. The constitutional
challenges have been brought in several forms,62 but the most noteworthy
important to realize that those benefits come with a cost. The cost is less due-process
protections for defendants.”). Representative Garrett also introduced legislation intending to
“restore due process rights for all Americans” by granting administrative respondents a
mandatory right of removal to federal district court. Due Process Restoration Act of 2015,
H.R. 3798, 114th Congress (2015-2016); Press Release, Representative Scott Garrett, House
of Representatives, Garrett Introduces Bill to Restore Due Process Rights for All Americans
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://garrett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/garrett-introduces-billto-restore-due-process-rights-for-all-americans [https://perma.cc/U2LF-RBSN].
The
legislation, which would essentially eliminate administrative proceedings as a mechanism
for resolving securities fraud matters, has yet to receive a full House vote. The Financial
CHOICE Act of 2016, the bill introduced by Republicans to overhaul Dodd-Frank, contains
a similar provision. Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Congress (20152016).
58. Yuka Hayashi, SEC’s White Defends In-House Courts, but Sees Need to
Modernize,
WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT
(Nov.
17,
2015,
2:52
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/11/17/secs-white-defends-in-house-courts-but-seesneed-to-modernize [https://perma.cc/2T29-NS54].
59. Andrew Ceresney, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law
Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/ZY5B-CA7C].
60. Id.
61. Spunaugle, supra note 49, at 411.
62. Additional challenges have been brought under Article I, the Seventh Amendment,
and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. These challenges have been uniformly
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challenge arises under Article II’s Appointments Clause.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In response to these constitutional challenges, the Commission has
argued that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
challenges until the challenging party has exhausted all possible
administrative remedies.63 The argument rests on 15 U.S.C. § 78y, which
provides that judicial review of administrative proceedings can come only
from a federal court of appeals, and only after the administrative
proceeding has concluded and the Commission has issued a final order.64
While federal district courts have original jurisdiction over claims arising
under the Constitution,65 Congress may restrict that original jurisdiction
with a statutory scheme that “displays a ‘fairly discernible’ intent to limit
jurisdiction, and [if] the claims at issue ‘are of the type Congress intended
to be reviewed within the statutory structure.’”66 The Commission has
argued that Congressional intent to limit jurisdiction is clear from the text
of 15 U.S.C. § 78y and the claims at issue are of the type that Congress
intended to be reviewed within the statutory scheme.67
Plaintiffs seeking to collaterally attack their administrative
proceedings in federal district court prior to the conclusion of the
administrative process experienced early success in establishing federal
subject matter jurisdiction.68 In order for a constitutional claim against the
SEC to receive an intermediate ruling, the plaintiff must show that (1) “a
finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review,” (2)
the suit is “wholly collateral to [the] statute’s review provisions,” and (3)
the “claims are outside [of] the agency’s expertise.”69 First, courts held that
rejected. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (rejecting a
Seventh Amendment argument), vacated on other grounds, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
63. See, e.g., id. at 1305.
64. Id.
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.”).
66. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010)
(quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207-12 (1994)).
67. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1305-06.
68. Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1302-04 (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1305-06;
Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *20
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Gray Financial Group v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at *33 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th
Cir. 2016).
69. Free Enter. Fund, 516 U.S. at 489 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the statutory scheme for judicial review is not meaningful because if the
plaintiff were required to raise his constitutional claims following the entire
administrative proceeding, he would be forced to endure what he contends
is an unconstitutional process.70 Further, if a plaintiff were forced to endure
the entire administrative process before raising his claim, the plaintiff’s
claim would be moot because a court of appeals cannot foreclose an
unconstitutional proceeding that has already occurred.71 Second, courts
held that constitutional claims are wholly collateral to the administrative
proceeding because the plaintiffs are not challenging the Commission’s
decision, but rather the Commission’s ability to constitutionally make that
decision.72 Third, courts held that constitutional challenges are outside of
the Commission’s expertise because constitutional claims are governed by
Supreme Court jurisprudence, not “technical considerations of agency
policy.”73
While plaintiffs experienced early success in establishing subject
matter jurisdiction, the SEC has achieved a number of significant appellate
victories over the past seventeen months, virtually settling the law
regarding jurisdiction in the SEC’s favor. Between August 2015 and
December 2016, five federal appellate courts—the Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals—held that the
statutory scheme contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78y provides the exclusive
mechanism for a party seeking review of an adverse administrative
decision.74 Analyzing the Free Enterprise factors, the courts first
determined that the administrative scheme does not foreclose all
meaningful judicial review because, even if constitutional claims cannot be
raised administratively, the statutory scheme provides for federal appellate
court review of those claims after the plaintiff has exhausted the
administrative process.75 Second, the courts held that the constitutional
70. See, e.g., Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1307-09; see also Jones, supra note 2, at 523
(commenting that winning a federal securities case on a constitutional issue after all
administrative remedies have been exhausted may be “little more than a Pyrrhic victory”
since by that point “[a]ll the clients and business will have already left, and the respondent
will have nothing left to fight for”).
71. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1307-09.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1309.
73. See, e.g., id. at 1309-10.
74. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276,
282 (2d Cir. 2016); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bebo v. SEC, 799
F.3d 765, 775 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016); Bennett v. SEC, No. 152584, slip op. at 30 (4th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).
75. See, e.g., Hill, 825 F.3d at 1243. See also Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775 (“This Court’s
jurisdiction is not an escape hatch for litigants to delay or derail an administrative action
when statutory channels of review are entirely adequate.”) (quoting Chau v. SEC, 72 F.
Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
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claims are not “wholly collateral” to any Commission orders or rules from
which review might be sought because the plaintiffs have raised the
constitutional issue as an affirmative defense and the Commission will
eventually rule on those claims in its final orders.76 Third, the courts held
that the Commission and its ALJs are “fully capable” of hearing
constitutional challenges, at least in the first instance.77
While it is likely that the recent precedent created by the Second,
Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits will continue to gain traction
across the country, reviewing courts in other circuits should consider
finding subject matter jurisdiction and proceeding to the merits of the
constitutional challenge. There is a strong argument that all of the Free
Enterprise factors are satisfied and the courts denying jurisdiction came to
an incorrect conclusion. First, judicial review under the administrative
scheme should not be considered meaningful because, even though a
federal court of appeals could vacate an adverse Commission order on
constitutional grounds, it could not remedy the harm that the plaintiff
attempted to allege in district court. Judicial review that comes at a point
when the harm alleged cannot possibly be remedied should not be
considered meaningful. Second, the constitutional claims should be
considered wholly collateral to the Commission decisions from which
review is sought because the claims do not depend upon the facts of any
particular case. Even if a plaintiff raised the issue as an affirmative
defense, as the plaintiff must to preserve his ability to later object, the
constitutional challenge is entirely unrelated to the underlying alleged
securities law violation. For that reason, the constitutional challenge
should also be considered outside of the ALJs’ expertise. Questions of
administrative and constitutional law are squarely within the province of
federal judges, not SEC employees. Therefore, reviewing courts should
consider holding that they do have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’
constitutional claims and proceeding to the merits of those claims.
2. Appointments Clause Violation
The most significant constitutional challenge facing the Commission
asserts that the Commission’s scheme for appointing ALJs violates the
Appointments Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution and
therefore the ALJs designated as hearing officers have no lawful authority
to preside over cases.78 Article II provides that “Congress may by Law vest
76. See, e.g., Tilton, 824 F.3d at 287-88.
77. See, e.g., Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 28.
78. See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 WL 4006165, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d
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the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”79
Commission ALJs are not appointed by the President, the courts, or the
SEC Commissioners, but are instead hired by the SEC’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law
Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel
Management.80 Accordingly, respondents have contended that the ALJ
appointment scheme is unconstitutional.
While arguing about the precise technicalities of how ALJs are
appointed may seem pedantic, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
Appointments Clause is “more than a matter of ‘etiquette or protocol’; it is
among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”81
Its fundamental purpose is to preserve “the Constitution’s structural
integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power” by
guarding against Congressional encroachment upon the Executive
Branch.82
On the merits, the Commission has argued that, even if federal district
courts do have subject matter jurisdiction, the Appointments Clause claims
should fail because its ALJs are not “inferior officers” under the
Constitution, but are instead mere employees, the hiring and firing of
whom is not governed by Article II.83 (Indeed, the full Commission came
to that conclusion itself in an appealed administrative proceeding.84) An
appointee is an inferior officer, and not a mere employee, if the appointee
exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”85
To determine whether an appointee exercises “significant authority,” courts
look to “(1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the
discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of
those decisions.”86 The Commission relied on Landry v. FDIC to argue
that since ALJs cannot issue final orders, they cannot be considered inferior
1297, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
80. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (discussing the ALJ appointment process).
81. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
82. Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991). See also Ryder v. United States,
515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (“The Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its
power at the expense of another branch . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317.
84. In the Matter of Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
75837, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act Release No.
31806, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15006, 2015 WL 5172953, at *23 (Sept. 3, 2015), aff’d, No.
15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
86. Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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officers.87 In Landry, the D.C. Circuit considered whether FDIC ALJs
were inferior officers and held that they were not because they could not
issue final orders, even though their office is established by law, their
duties, salaries, and means of appointment are specified by statute, and they
conduct trials, take testimony, rule on evidence admissibility, enforce
discovery compliance, and exercise significant discretion.88
Before appellate cases Bebo, Bennett, Jarkesy, Tilton, and Hill were
decided in the past seventeen months, the district courts finding subject
matter jurisdiction and reaching the merits had uniformly ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs and preliminarily enjoined the SEC from pursuing the
plaintiffs’ cases administratively, relying on Freytag v. Commissioner and
finding that the ALJ appointments likely violated Article II’s Appointment
Clause.89 In Freytag, the Supreme Court held that Tax Court “special trial
judges” are inferior officers because the office is established by law, the
duties, salary, and means of appointment are specified by statute, and the
judges perform significant tasks such as taking testimony, conducting trials,
ruling on the admissibility of evidence, enforcing compliance with
discovery orders, issuing final decisions in certain limited circumstances,
and exercising significant discretion throughout.90 Relying on Freytag, the
district courts held that, like the special trial judges in that case, SEC ALJs
exercise “significant authority” and discretion sufficient to make them
inferior officers.91 The district court in Hill, for example, concluded that
“the Supreme Court in Freytag found that the [special trial judges’]
powers—which are nearly identical to the SEC ALJs[’] here—were
independently sufficient to find that [special trial judges] were inferior
officers.”92 It reasoned that Landry was incorrect in reading Freytag as
holding that authority to render a final decision is a necessary factor for an
appointee to be considered an inferior officer.93
In August 2016, a federal appellate court reviewed a fully ripe
Appointments Clause challenge for the first time. In Lucia v. SEC, an SEC
ALJ imposed sanctions on Lucia for violating the Investment Advisors Act

87. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317-18.
88. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34.
89. Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1316-17 (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1320-21;
Gray Financial Group v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-0492-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131792, at
*46-*51 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
90. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).
91. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1317; Ironridge Global IV, 146 F. Supp. 3d. at 1313; Duka,
124 F. Supp. 3d at 289.
92. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.
93. Id.
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of 1940 and the rule against misleading advertising.94 In accordance with
the statutory review scheme provided for in § 78y, Lucia waited for the full
Commission to rule against him and appealed the decision to the D.C.
Circuit, arguing that the ALJ who heard the enforcement action was
unconstitutionally appointed.95
The D.C. Circuit came to the opposite conclusion from the district
courts that reached the merits and ruled in favor of the SEC.96 Although
the Commission acknowledged that the ALJ who heard Lucia’s case was
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, the D.C.
Circuit held that Article II did not apply because the ALJ was a mere
employee of the SEC, not an inferior officer.97 Relying on Landry, the
D.C. Circuit determined that the presence or absence of final decisionmaking power is “critical” to determining whether an appointee is an
inferior officer, and its analysis “beg[an], and end[ed],” there.98 Because an
ALJ decision cannot “be deemed the action of the Commission” until the
Commission issues a final order, the court held that SEC ALJs are mere
employees, not inferior officers, and thus do not trigger the protections of
Article II.99
In December 2016, however, a second federal appellate court
reviewed a fully ripe Appointments Clause challenge and came to the
opposite conclusion. In Bandimere v. SEC, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that SEC ALJs are appointed in
violation of the Appointments Clause, marking the first time that a federal
appellate court has accepted an argument challenging the constitutionality
of the SEC’s ALJ appointment scheme and creating a significant circuit
split.100
The court in Bandimere utilized much of the same reasoning that the
district courts used in preliminarily enjoining the SEC from pursuing cases
administratively. Relying on Freytag, the court held that SEC ALJs are
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause because the office of the
SEC ALJ is established by law, statutes set forth SEC ALJs’ duties,
salaries, and means of appointment, and SEC ALJs exercise “significant
discretion” in performing the same types of “important functions” as the

94.
2016).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9,
Id.
Id. at *44.
Id. at *9, *19-*25.
Id. at *12-*14.
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c); id. at *19-*25.
Bandimere v. SEC, No. 15-9586, slip op. at 22 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016).
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special trial judges did in Freytag.101 The court rejected the SEC’s
argument and the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Lucia that ALJs’ lack of final
decision-making power is dispositive.102 According to the court, “[f]inal
decision-making power is relevant in determining whether a public servant
exercises significant authority. But that does not mean every inferior
officer must possess final decision-making power. Freytag’s holding
undermines that contention. In short, the [Supreme] Court did not make
final decision-making power the essence of inferior officer status.”103
Because ALJs are inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause and
the SEC ALJ at issue held his office unconstitutionally when he presided
over Bandimere’s hearing, the Tenth Circuit set aside the SEC’s opinion
imposing liability on Bandimere.104
The Tenth Circuit’s argument better comports with Supreme Court
precedent, and courts confronted with an Appointments Clause challenge
should hold that SEC ALJs are inferior officers. ALJs wield significant
authority and exercise significant discretion pursuant to the laws of the
United States, even if they cannot issue final orders. The office of the ALJ
is established by law, and ALJs’ duties, salaries, and means of appointment
are specified by statute. ALJs are permanent employees who have the
power to take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of
evidence, and enforce compliance with discovery orders.105 They also have
authority to issue initial decisions that declare respondents liable and
impose sanctions,106 and to enter default judgments and steer the outcome
of proceedings by requiring attendance at settlement conferences.107 As the
Tenth Circuit noted in Bandimere, nothing in Freytag indicates that the
ability to issue a final order is a necessary condition for an official to be
considered an inferior officer.108 Indeed, as the Landry concurrence noted,
the Landry majority’s holding was based on an alternative holding from
Freytag, since the Supreme Court had already determined that special trial
101. Id., slip op. at 17-19. As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, its holding serves
the purposes of the Appointments Clause. “The current ALJ hiring process
whereby the OPM screens applicants, proposes three finalists to the SEC, and then
leaves it to somebody at the agency to pick one, is a diffuse process that does not
lend itself to the accountability that the Appointments Clause was written to
secure. In other words, it is unclear where the appointment buck stops.” Id., slip
op. at 23.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id., slip op. at 28.
Id. (emphasis in original).

Id., slip op. at 37.

5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 201.180.
17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14(a)(8), 200.30-9(a), 201.360.
17 C.F.R. §§ 201.155, 201.111(e).

Bandimere, slip op. at 27.
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judges were inferior officers before it analyzed the final order authority
issue.109 The special trial judges’ limited authority to issue a final order
was only an additional reason, not the reason, that the Supreme Court held
that Tax Court special trial judges are inferior officers.110 Therefore, the
presence or absence of final decision-making authority should not be
dispositive.
Even if SEC ALJs cannot issue final orders, the significant authority
and discretion bestowed upon them should be sufficient for them to be
considered inferior officers.
Much like the “district court clerk,”
“thousands of clerks in the Departments of Treasury [and the] Interior,” the
“assistant surgeon,” “cadet-engineer,” “election monitors,” “federal
marshals,” “military judges,” “judges in Article I courts,” and “the general
counsel of the Department of Transportation,” all of which the Supreme
Court has held are inferior officers,111 SEC ALJs should be considered
inferior officers and trigger Article II protections.
Once a court determines that ALJs are inferior officers, the
Appointments Clause violation is apparent. SEC ALJs are not appointed
by the President, the courts of law, or the SEC Commissioners, as is
required by Article II, but are instead hired by the SEC’s Office of
Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law
Judge, human resource functions, and the Office of Personnel
Management.112 Indeed, the SEC itself admitted in Lucia that its ALJs are
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.113
Accordingly, reviewing courts should find the ALJ appointment scheme to
be unconstitutional.
C. Consequences of a Finding of Unconstitutionality
A Supreme Court determination that the SEC’s ALJ appointment
process is unconstitutional would affect not only the SEC, but also all 31
other federal administrative agencies, which together appoint more than
1,300 ALJs.114 The Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, for
109. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204; 17 C.F.R. § 200.14
113. Lucia v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14559, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9,
2016).
114. Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the Constitutionality of Some of Its
Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:58 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitutionalityof-some-of-its-court-proceedings/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/V4UH-ZKQK].
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example, uses ALJs in much the same manner as the SEC does and CFTC
ALJs have nearly equivalent powers as do SEC ALJs.115 The CFTC’s
administrative practice is relatively new, and it does not yet appear to have
been challenged in federal court. However, former CFTC Chairman
William T. Bagley characterized the administrative scheme in which “the
Commission itself is a rule maker, policeman, grand jury, prosecutor, judge
and jury with de novo powers in the same case at virtually the same time”
as “undue process.”116
The Federal Trade Commission, which also employs ALJs, has taken
a different path in response to constitutional challenges brought under the
Appointments Clause. On September 14, 2015, the FTC denied a
respondent’s motion to dismiss an FTC administrative proceeding, holding
that, under Landry, its ALJs are not inferior officers because their initial
decisions are reviewed by the FTC Commissioners before becoming
final.117
Nevertheless, the FTC Commissioners ratified the ALJ’s
appointment to “put[] to rest any possible claim that this administrative
proceeding violates the Appointments Clause.”118
While an appellate ruling that the ALJ appointment process is
unconstitutional would create problems for the SEC, such a ruling would
not be fatal. Final administrative decisions would not be subject to attack
because even when an adjudicator lacks the power to decide a case, the
presumption in favor of finality means that once a judgment has become
final, the issue cannot be raised collaterally.119 Administrative proceedings
115. Indeed, many CFTC ALJs may actually be SEC ALJs themselves. Since the
CFTC’s Director of Enforcement recently announced that the CFTC intends to start using
administrative proceedings for enforcement cases after a number of years in which it never
did so, the CFTC has been “borrowing” ALJs from other areas of the government. Jean
Eaglesham, CFTC Turns Toward Administrative Judges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-turns-toward-administrative-judges-1415573398
[https://perma.cc/5XC8-Y453].
Much like SEC administrative proceedings, CFTC
administrative proceedings may be more challenging for respondents than federal court
proceedings because of the lack of depositions and the limits on third party discovery. 17
C.F.R. § 10.42-44. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 10.8 (describing the functions and responsibilities
of CFTC ALJs) with 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (describing the functions and responsibilities of
SEC ALJs).
116. Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement
Proceedings: Efficient Justice or a Biased Forum?, 35 No. 2 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP. 1 (2015), quoting William T. Bagley, Introduction: A New Body of Law in an Era of
Industry Growth, 27 EMORY L.J. 849, 851 (1978).
117. In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *1, *2 (F.T.C. Sept.
14, 2015).
118. Id. at *2.
119. Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall, & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC
Administrative Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement
Actions, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1238 (BNA) (2015) (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey,
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that have already been brought but in which a decision is not yet final
would likely be voided and vacated without prejudice, allowing the SEC to
bring the action again at a later time in front of a properly appointed
hearing officer.120 A ruling that the ALJ appointment scheme is
unconstitutional would likely be applied prospectively and stayed for a
period to allow the agency to correct the constitutional violations, as the
Supreme Court did when it declared the bankruptcy courts
unconstitutional.121
III.

COMMISSION RESPONSES

The SEC has responded to some of this criticism by adopting several
proposed changes to its Rules of Practice and by promulgating guidance
regarding the Enforcement Division’s approach to forum selection in
contested actions. In addition, evidence shows that the SEC may be easing
its increased use of administrative proceedings.122 However, the SEC has
refused to fix the Appointments Clause violation by having the full
Commission ratify its ALJs’ appointments.123

557 U.S. 137, 154 (2009) (explaining the need for finality and noting that if the “law were
otherwise, and courts could evaluate the jurisdiction that they may or may not have had to
issue a final judgment, the rules of res judicata . . . would be entirely short circuited”)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. Hardy, Kendall, & Rein, supra note 119 (citing United States v. L.A. Trucker
Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (holding that “a defect in the appointment of [an ALJ
precursor] was, if properly raised, an irregularity which would invalidate a resulting order”)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
121. Northern Pacific Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88
(1982).
122. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,
2015,
9:00
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges1444611604 [https://perma.cc/D2MD-B6ME] (noting that over July, August, and
September of 2015, the SEC proceeded administratively in only four of its thirty-six
contested cases). The SEC has also proceeded in federal court for all twenty people against
whom it has brought contested insider-trading charges since Hill. Id.
123. See Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs
Branch to The Honorable Richard M. Berman regarding Duka v. SEC, No. 15-cv-357
(RMB) (June 15, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/06/dukavsecsecanswtoberman.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWR3-EVM7] (“The government believes that the
Commission should not act precipitously to modify its ALJ scheme. This is particularly the
case when the SEC has over 100 litigated proceedings at various stages of the administrative
process and the ALJ scheme has been in use for seven decades and is grounded in a highlyregulated competitive service system that Congress created for the selection, hiring and
appointment of ALJs in the Executive Branch.”).

2016]

DEVELOPMENTS IN SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

231

A. Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Practice
On September 9, 2015, the SEC issued a press release announcing
proposed amendments to “modernize” its Rules of Practice.124 Primarily,
the proposed rules sought to address the short period of time a respondent
has to prepare for an administrative hearing and the absence of any real
opportunity for a respondent to take discovery.125 The Commission
adopted the proposed amendments on July 13, 2016. 126
First, the amendments extend the deadline by which an ALJ must
issue an initial decision.127 Specifically, the amended Rule 360 implements
a change in the deadline for the initial ALJ decision from 300 days from
the date of service of the OIP to as much as 120 days from the completion
of post-hearing or other dispositive briefing.128 The amended Rule also
provides a four to ten month range of time in which the administrative
hearing must begin, thus more than doubling the current amount of time in
which respondents may prepare for a hearing.129 Further, the amended Rule
creates a procedure for extending the initial decision deadline by up to
thirty days.130
While the SEC’s attempt to give respondents more time to prepare for
administrative hearings is a step in the right direction, the amended rule
does not materially increase the amount of time respondents have to
prepare a meaningful defense. While under the amended rule respondents
have up to an additional six months to prepare for a hearing, even ten
months is often insufficient to fully review the SEC’s investigative record
and prepare for a hearing, especially in an age of electronic discovery
where the investigative file can include millions of electronic documents
and other communications.131 A more reasonable timeline, such as a
124. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes to
Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings, Release No. 2015-209 (Sept. 24,
2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html
[https://perma.cc/R7SLTXN6].
125. Id.
126. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts
Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings, Release No. 2016-142
(July
13,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html
[https://perma.cc/T6RQ-VFS9].
127. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amendments to Commission’s Rules
of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319, Rule 360 (July 13, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UAA-BWUR]
[hereinafter Amended Rules].
128. 17 C.F.R. 201.360.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. In Chau, supra note 75, the SEC’s investigative file was reportedly larger than the
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minimum of one year, would give respondents a better ability to assess
their cases at an earlier stage and may prompt earlier settlement discussions
and more useful Wells submissions.132 At any rate, ALJs should be able to
grant motions requesting extensions greater than thirty days for good cause.
Second, the amendments attempt to provide respondents with a greater
opportunity to develop arguments and defenses during discovery. While
the pre-amendment rules did not provide for depositions, the amended Rule
233 permits each side to take up to three depositions in a single-respondent
administrative proceeding, or up to five depositions in an administrative
proceeding involving multiple respondents.133 The amended Rule also
permits the ALJ to allow up to an additional two depositions upon a
showing of compelling need and allows a party to ask the ALJ to subpoena
documents in connection with a deposition.134 The amended rules also
adopt processes related to depositions that are similar to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.135 Separately, the amended rules clarify that hearsay
evidence should be excluded if it is unreliable, although hearsay evidence
may still be admitted if it is relevant, material, and bears satisfactory
indicia of reliability so that its use is fair.136
While the amended rules allow each respondent to gather from
witnesses a modest additional amount of information beyond what is
contained in the SEC’s file, the permitted number of depositions is
insufficient to level the playing field, especially in multi-respondent cases
in which respondents may have divergent interests and may wish to depose
different witnesses. Even if the respondents’ interests were perfectly
aligned, the number of relevant witnesses is likely to be greater than five or
seven, especially since the rules contain no separate provision for expert
witnesses and fact and expert witnesses are treated alike. Since the
Enforcement Division can interview an unlimited number of witnesses over
a number of years, allowing respondents between three and seven
depositions does not provide respondents with a significant procedural
protection. Whatever the number of permitted depositions is, ALJs should
be given discretion to allow a respondent to take more than two additional
depositions for good cause.
entire printed Library of Congress. In re Harding Advisory and Wing F. Chau, Adm. Proc.
File. No. 3-15574, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2014).
132. After the Commission sends a letter to an entity informing it that the Commission
is planning to bring an enforcement action against it (a “Wells Notice”), the potential
respondent may “submit a written statement to the Commission setting forth their interests
and position with regard to the subject matter of the investigation.” 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c).
133. Amended Rules, Rule 233.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Amended Rules, Rule 320.
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While clarifying that “unreliable” hearsay is inadmissible is a positive
for respondents, the amended rules give no guidance as to what hearsay is
reliable and what hearsay is unreliable. The Rules of Practice should adopt
the Federal Rules of Evidence and its hearsay exceptions, at least in cases
involving non-regulated entities, so that the SEC cannot forum shop to
ensure that its preferred evidence is admissible. Overall, while the
amendments to the Rules of Practice are a step in the right direction,
respondents still have too little time to prepare for hearings, respondents
still have too little opportunity to develop defenses through discovery and
depositions, and the SEC may still rely on hearsay evidence.
B. Issuing Guidance Regarding Forum Selection
The Commission has also promulgated guidance laying out its
approach to forum selection in contested actions, perhaps in an effort to
prevent Equal Protection challenges.137 While noting that there is “no rigid
formula dictating the choice of forum,” the Commission will recommend
the forum that “will best utilize the Commission’s limited resources to
carry out its mission.”138
The guidance lays out four relevant
considerations.
First, the Enforcement Division will consider the
availability of desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each
forum.139 Some actions can only be pursued administratively, such as
where the Commission charges failure to supervise, while others, such as
control person liability, must be brought in federal district court.140
Likewise, only a federal district court can issue emergency relief, such as
temporary restraining orders, asset freezes, and document preservation
orders.141
137. Gupta v. S.E.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), provides an
example of when a decision to proceed administratively rather than in federal court may
raise equal protection issues. In response to the infamous Raj Rajaratnam and Galleon
Group insider-trading scheme, the SEC filed 28 of its 29 enforcement actions in the
Southern District of New York, but initially pursued its case against former Goldman Sachs
and Procter & Gamble board member Rajat Gupta administratively. Id. After Gupta filed a
complaint in the Southern District of New York alleging that “the SEC’s unjustified
decision to deprive Gupta, alone, of the opportunity to contest these allegations in federal
court singles him out for uniquely unfavorable treatment in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution,” the SEC dismissed the administrative proceeding and filed suit
in federal district court. Id.
138. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement Approach to
Forum Selection in Contested Actions, at 1, www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementapproach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VGL-P2WC].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Second, the Division will consider whether any charged party is a
registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity.142
Regulated entities have long been subject to administrative proceedings and
ALJs may have expertise and experience in certain issues that frequently
arise involving such entities, both of which favor bringing charges against
regulated entities administratively.143
Third, the Division will consider the cost-, resource-, and timeeffectiveness of litigation in each forum.144 Consideration of efficient and
effective use of the Commission’s limited resources weighs in favor of
bringing cases administratively, where actions are heard more quickly, but
the ability to seek relief against multiple diverse parties in a single
proceeding weighs in favor of federal district court.145 Efficiencies
associated with motions for summary judgment weigh in favor of federal
district court if the disputed issues can be decided at that stage, since
motions for summary judgment in federal district court can address a broad
range of issues while motions for summary disposition in administrative
proceedings are much more limited.146 However, the longer time frame and
larger amount of available pretrial discovery in federal district court present
a number of efficiency costs.147
Finally, and most controversially, the Division will consider which
forum leads to the most fair, consistent, and effective resolutions of
securities law issues and matters.148 Since ALJs and the Commission have
extensive knowledge and experience concerning the federal securities laws
and complex or technical securities industry practices and products, “if a
contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under
the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s rules,” the
Commission will consider whether obtaining a Commission decision on
those issues will “facilitate development of the law.”149 If state law or
another specialized area of federal law is at issue, federal district court may
be more appropriate.150
While the guidance is helpful in attacking the perception that the
Commission is simply taking its tougher cases to its ALJs, the guidelines
put the Commission’s own efficiency interests above all else and do not
give weight to how a particular forum will affect the rights of a respondent.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2016]

DEVELOPMENTS IN SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

235

The fourth consideration is by far the most significant. By seeking to bring
more cases with complex and unsettled legal issues in-house, the
Commission exacerbates the criticism voiced by Judge Rakoff and others
that the Commission should expose novel applications of the securities law
to de novo judicial review.151 The Commission’s indication that it will
“send[] the toughest cases to its own judges to develop the law as it prefers
rather than using federal district judges, who may be less amenable to its
arguments,” takes on particular weight under Chevron.152 Given the
considerable deference that SEC interpretations enjoy, the check that
judicial review purportedly provides on the SEC may not be particularly
meaningful.
Justice Scalia questioned whether the SEC’s interpretations of the
securities laws are actually owed such deference, especially when a
violation can result in criminal prosecution in addition to civil charges.153
According to Justice Scalia, federal appellate deference to the SEC’s
interpretations of statutory provisions to which criminal prohibitions are
attached, such as Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
means that the SEC “can in effect create (and uncreate) new crimes at will,
so long as they do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws contain.”154
Essentially, the SEC’s guidance suggests that the Commission should
shape the law before it reaches a federal appeals court, at which point
appellate judges should defer to the Commission’s expertise in deciding
what constitutes a violation.
Overall, the proposed guidance does not meaningfully constrain the
scope of the Enforcement Division’s discretion in seeking a particular
venue, but rather affirms the Commission’s view that forum selection is
within its broad discretion without meaningful limitations.
CONCLUSION
One defense attorney has aptly summed up the perceived conflict of
interest that arises when the SEC brings cases administratively:
The SEC makes the rules, interprets the rules, revises the rules
without public notice and comment, reverses the rules on
151. See Rakoff, supra note 45 (noting the author’s concern that the SEC may be
becoming a “law unto itself”).
152. Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-insec-cases.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6CEF-SLWY].
153. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (mem.) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[L]egislatures, not executive officers, define
crimes.”).
154. Id.
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occasion, enforces the rules, and prosecutes alleged violators of
the rules with its own attorneys. It hires and pays its own judges,
has its own judges hear most of the cases based on their own
rules of evidence and decides 90 percent of those cases in its
favor. It hands out the punishments and penalties, and it hears all
appeals of its judges’ decisions. And all of this takes place
before a federal court has any involvement in the process.155

The SEC must act quickly to reverse this perception. The simple fix
to the Appointments Clause issue is for the SEC to reappoint its existing
ALJs using a constitutionally appropriate procedure, such as direct
appointment by the Commissioners. However, the SEC has not undertaken
this fix, and it will likely continue to resist doing so either because it does
not want to concede a point to the defense bar or because its
Commissioners cannot agree on the necessity of doing so. In the
alternative, the SEC could induce potential respondents to waive the
constitutional issue before commencing new proceedings, but that strategy
would likely cost the Commission at the bargaining table.
While five federal circuit courts of appeals have now ruled in favor of
the SEC on the jurisdictional issue, the circuits are evenly split on the
merits of the Appointments Clause question. Respondents seeking to
challenge the constitutionality of the SEC ALJ appointment procedure
should first pursue their claims through to the conclusion of the
administrative process before raising the issue in federal court. However,
once the administrative process is complete, respondents turning to a nonD.C. Circuit federal court of appeals should find success. Over the next
several years, as enforcement actions wind through the administrative
process and subsequent appeals properly reach the federal appellate courts,
there is a strong likelihood that several appellate courts will side with the
Tenth Circuit and recognize that SEC ALJs are inferior officers who trigger
the protections of Article II. While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Bebo, it may choose to have the last word on the matter now that a circuit
split has developed.
Even if it ameliorates the Appointments Clause issue, the SEC must
still take concrete steps to restore public trust. First, the SEC should
reverse its policy of bringing cases involving complex facts or novel legal
issues administratively. Such a step would assuage the concern that the
Commission is bringing difficult cases in-house to increase its chance to
win or to ensure that the securities laws are developed in its favor. Second,
the SEC should publish concrete guidance relating to its forum decisions,
which would allow potential respondents to advocate more effectively in
155. Steve Howard, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and its Implications for the
SEC, 21 No. 20 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 1, 7 (2015).
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the Wells process for selection of one forum or the other. The Commission
could also move away from its new policy of requiring certain respondents
to admit wrongdoing, rather than allowing them to settle while neither
admitting nor denying wrongdoing, which would lessen the sting of
administrative proceedings for some respondents.156
Since Congress created the administrative scheme, it may need to
provide the remedy by legislation either significantly curtailing the SEC’s
discretion in choosing a forum or increasing the procedural protections
available to administrative respondents. Federal judges should also force
the SEC’s hand, at least regarding the Article II issue, by holding that the
appointments of SEC ALJs must comply with the United States
Constitution. However change is instituted, it must take place soon to
protect both the SEC’s legitimacy and the rights of individuals and entities
accused of wrongdoing.

156. See Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at
the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full
Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539841202 [https://perma.cc/T8NW-78HF] (explaining that no-admit-no-deny policies
lead to a higher likelihood of settling, which in turn will “eliminate all litigation risk, resolve
the case, return money to victims more quickly, and preserve our enforcement resources”).

